

European Social Democracy and the Quest for Electoral Relevance

**Explaining the vote to socialist parties across
seventeen countries in the first decade of the
21st century**

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Abstract

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, European social democratic parties faced strategic contingent choices concerning the formation of stable electoral coalitions in the context of expanding tertiary education, changing occupational structures and the sophistication of voters. Previous research has shown that the salience of class voting experienced variations while socio-cultural conflicts typical of post-industrial societies gained importance. This study aims to explain the vote to European socialist parties via socio-structural characteristics as well as values and issue preferences, plus their interaction, in the first decade of the 2000s. Building on previous work, the paper examines the weight of socio-structural characteristics in comparison to ideological factors; the direct effects of class, education and gender on voting behavior, and their indirect impact on values and issue preferences; and the interplay between education and class. Based on the review of literature regarding “Old” and “New” Politics, the evolving electoral strategies of socialist parties and the role of class, education and gender in contemporary voting behavior, binary and multinomial logistic regressions are devised to be employed in longitudinal, cross-national data of seventeen countries from the *European Social Survey* (ESS) in the period 2002-2010. The results reveal that ideological factors explain socialist vote better than socio-structural ones. Social class, education, and gender influence voting behavior both directly and indirectly via values and issue preferences, being class more salient in orienting the vote in “Old Politics” issues and education in “New Politics”; gender yields singular effects. Regarding the last research objective, individuals with “*Upper secondary education*” (ISCED 3) are more likely to vote similarly across social classes, being Higher and Lower Service workers more propense to vote socialist at this level. Contrarily, Routine Clerical/Sales workers with “*Tertiary education completed*” (ISCED 5-6) exhibit more propensity to vote social democratic parties. Finally, the interclass distance of Routine clerical/sales and Skilled manual workers is demonstrated to be small. Further research should focus on the voting convergence of the old working class and the new middle classes; the interplay of education, gender and social class, and the evolving nature of socialist voting across regions in the context of globalization and the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008.

Resum

A finals del s. XX i principis del s. XXI, la socialdemocràcia europea es va enfrontar a decisions estratègiques contingents per conformar coalicions electorals estables en un context d'expansió de l'educació terciària, el canvi en l'estructura ocupacional i la creixent sofisticació dels votants. Investigacions anteriors han demostrat que la importància del vot de classe ha experimentat variacions mentre els conflictes socioculturals guanyaven preeminència en les societats post-industrials. L'estudi pretén explicar el vot als partits socialistes europeus en funció de les característiques socioestructurals, per una banda, i els valors i preferències sobre *issues*, per l'altra. La seva interacció també és examinada. A partir dels treballs anteriors, el treball investiga la importància de les característiques socioestructurals enfront dels factors ideològics; els efectes directes de la classe, el nivell educatiu i el gènere sobre el comportament polític, així com el seu impacte en la formació de valors i preferències; i la interacció entre educació i classe. Basant-nos en la revisió de literatura sobre "New Politics" i "Old Politics", les estratègies electorals dels partits socialistes i el paper de la classe, l'educació i el gènere en la conducta contemporània de vot, es desenvolupen diferents models a partir de regressions logístiques binominals i multinomials aplicades a dades longitudinals de disset països de la *European Social Survey* (ESS) durant el període 2002-2010. Els resultats demostren que els factors ideològics expliquen el vot socialista millor que els socioestructurals. La classe social, l'educació i el gènere influeixen en el comportament electoral de manera directa, i indirecta a través de valors i preferències en *issues*. En aquest sentit, detallem com la classe social orienta vot en qüestions de "Old Politics" i l'educació en "New Politics", mentre que el gènere es revela com un factor amb efectes propis. D'altra banda, les persones amb educació secundària superior completada (ISCED 3) tenen més probabilitats de votar similar a través de les diverses classes socials. Els grups socials amb més status (Grans/petits empresaris, managers, etc.) presenten una propensió més marcada a votar socialista en aquest nivell, mentre que els oficinistes i treballadors de cara al públic (vendes) es destaquen en nivells d'educació terciària (ISCED 5-6). Finalment, mostrem com existeix una convergència en el vot a la socialdemocràcia entre aquest grup i la classe obrera. De cara a futura recerca es recomana emprendre vies d'investigació que se centrin en la laminació de les diferències de vot entre les classes treballadores i les noves classes mitjanes; la interacció entre nivell educatiu, gènere i classe social, i l'evolució del vot socialista a les diferents regions europees en el marc de la globalització i la post-crisi de 2008.

Table of contents

List of tables	X
List of figures.....	XI
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Previous literature and theoretical explanations.....	3
2.1. “Old Politics” vs. “New Politics” – Cleavages, value orientations and new approaches	3
2.2. The reconfiguration of socialist bases	5
2.2.1. What is the Left? Class <i>cleavage</i> and electoral competition	5
2.2.2. Maximizing and molding the electoral coalition	6
2.3. Class.....	7
2.4. Education.....	9
2.5. Gender.....	10
3. Hypotheses	12
4. Data and operationalization.....	14
4.1. Methods and variables	17
4.1.1. Socio-structural model	17
4.1.2. Ideological and values model	19
4.2. Descriptive Statistics	20
4.2.1. Socio-structural variables	21
4.2.2. Ideological variables	28
5. Results.....	32
5.1. Socio-structural model.....	32
5.1.1. Interactions between <i>Education level</i> and <i>Social class</i>	34
5.2. Ideological model	38
5.3. Socio-structural variables – Values and preferences	40
5.3.1. Redistribution preferences	40
5.3.2. Cultural liberalism	43
5.3.3. Europeanism	45
5.3.4. Immigration.....	47
6. Discussion	49

Conclusions	54
References	56
Appendices	60
Appendix A – Predicted probabilities in the Socio-structural model.....	60
Appendix B – Interaction models Education – Class (Dummies ISCED).....	63
Appendix C – Ideological model with sublevels in <i>Redistribution</i> and <i>Cultural liberalism</i>	71
Appendix D – Predicted probabilities in the Ideological model.....	72
Appendix E – Predicted probabilities in the Interaction model between issue preferences and socio-structural factors	75

List of tables

Table 1. Countries included in the analysis with party variables, national social democratic parties, results average (2002-2010, in percentage) and socialist voters in ESS rounds (2002-2010, in percentage).....	15
Table 2. ECP Class Categories and internal composition	18
Table 3. Evolution of individuals from different social classes voting socialist parties	24
Table 4. Evolution of the vote to socialist groups by gender	26
Table 5. Education dummies – Difference between dummy category (1) minus other education levels (0) in each ISCED category.....	38
Table 6. Education dummies – Compared position of social classes across predicted share of vote when dummy = 1	38

List of figures

Figure 1. Evolution of the percentage of socialist voters and voters of other parties.....	22
Figure 2. Class composition of the vote of socialist and other parties.....	23
Figure 3. Social democratic voters across social classes	23
Figure 4. Social democratic voters across the highest education level achieved	24
Figure 5. Educational composition of voters	25
Figure 6. Social classes by level of education	25
Figure 7. Social democratic voters across present and former membership in trade unions.....	26
Figure 8. Age and vote in last national election	27
Figure 9. Religiosity degree and vote in last national election	27
Figure 10. Ideology self-positioning and vote in last national election.....	29
Figure 11. Redistribution preferences and socialist vote in last national election.....	29
Figure 12. Cultural liberalism and socialist vote in last national election	30
Figure 13. Immigration and vote in last national election	30
Figure 14. Europeanism and vote in last national election.....	31
Figure 15. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 0-1 and Social class.....	36
Figure 16. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 2 and Social class	36
Figure 17. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 3 and Social class	37
Figure 18. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 5-6 and Social class.....	37

1. Introduction

Even though social democracy is still a major political actor in European party systems, its overall influence has declined and its national platforms have been challenged by new competitors on the left and the right. As political parties are vote-maximizing platforms, they must adapt their electoral strategy to the socioeconomic and cultural dynamics of societies. In this sense, social democracy constitutes a paradigmatic example. Factors such as higher levels of education in conjunction with shifts in occupational and socio-demographical structures led to the reconstruction of their electoral base in order to win political contests. The objective of this research paper is to gauge the influence of both socio-structural characteristics and value and issue preferences, as well as their interaction, in the vote to social democratic parties.

Data employed in the research comes from aggregated five rounds of the *European Social Survey* (ESS) encompassing up to 163,339 individuals. Seventeen countries from all European regions are included in the analysis throughout the period 2002 – 2010. We apply logistical binary regressions to construct a set of socio-structural and ideological models. The same method is used to test the interaction between educational attainment and social class. Lastly, multinomial logistic regressions are devised to obtain the predicted probabilities of support to redistribution preferences (“Old Politics”) and cultural liberalism (“New Politics”), alongside Europeanism and the effect of immigration on the national economy across social class, education level and gender.

Taking inspiration from previous cross-national studies, this research paper offers renewed insights regarding comparative studies of the vote to social democratic parties focusing on the first decade of the 21st century. The selected time period offers current information about the influence of class, education and gender in forging values, orientations, and attitudes towards social, economic and political *issues*. Also, we underscore its direct impact on the vote. Diving into the latest trends of the voting behavior of European social democratic voters is key to offer a better understanding of the electoral core of social democracy in the 21st century.

In this research paper, we expect to attain several research objectives. First, to explore whether values and preferences (“New Politics”) are more important than socio-structural factors (“Old Politics”) in the decision of voting socialist. Second, to analyze the particular effect of class, education and gender to cast a vote for socialist platforms, as well as the way in which they conform or shape values and orientations that end up affecting political behavior. Finally, to examine the existence of interactions between education and class, and whether they yield diverse effects across categories.

Drawing on the conceptual and theoretical framework, five hypotheses and their accompanying sub-hypotheses are presented. First, we contend that the ideological model explains the vote to social democracy better than the socio-structural model. Second, social class explains well the vote to socialist parties. Third, educational attainment negatively affects the socialist vote. Fourth, the effect of educational attainment on the vote to socialist parties differs from that of social class. Fifth, socio-structural values directly affect the positioning on issues and value preferences. Social class is more prevalent in redistribution issues, while education is more salient in cultural issues.

The research paper starts in Section 2 with a review of literature of the mechanisms of “Old Politics” and “New Politics”, the underlying socioeconomic and cultural factors and the rationale behind the reconfiguration of socialist bases towards more open coalitions. Also, an overview of social class, education and gender in political behavior is offered. Section 3 summarizes the hypothesis derived from the theoretical framework. Selected data and its operationalization, alongside the methods and variables included in the models and descriptive statistics, are detailed in Section 4. Results of the logistic regressions are reported in Section 5. A discussion based on the main findings of the research and the theoretical reviews is developed in Section 6. To conclude, we present some conclusions reflecting on the totality of the research.

2. Previous literature and theoretical explanations

2.1. “Old Politics” vs. “New Politics” – Cleavages, value orientations and new approaches

Explanations regarding the mechanisms through which people vote have been a contentious issue in the field of Political Science. Amid the stability of Western European political systems in the late 60s, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) outlined a sociological approach drawing on the concept of *cleavage*. Critical junctures in past historical events, such as the Industrial Revolution and the creation of the nation-state, brought about political conflicts that pitted opposed collectivities against each other. Political parties were then the organized political manifestation of the antagonistic interests of class, religion or national identity.

From the 1970s onwards, alternative models to explain voting behavior gained preeminence. The challenge came from rational-individualistic, culturalist theories. Additionally, theories of political change combined with empirical studies pointed towards a *dealignment* process (Caínzos, 2001), even though its extent and deepness have not been totally captured (Evans, 1999a). As post-industrial society progressed, other proposals casted doubts on the sociological approach based on cleavages.

Inglehart (2018) argued a “*Silent Revolution*” had increased the appeal to post-material values in detriment to materialistic values. After World War II, new generations took physical security and well-being as granted, which contributed to more tolerance and progressive views on socio-cultural issues like LGBT+ rights or the role of women in society. As a result, new social movements like ecologism emerged alongside the New Left and Green parties within “New Politics” (Ibid).

Chiefly, expanding tolerance towards diversity was linked to both intergenerational replacement and value diffusion. This process was further fostered by expanding education and the influence of mass communications (Knutsen, 2018). On the same level, shifts in occupational and socio-demographical structures altered socializing processes. Two factors to take into account are the surge in public employment and the proliferation of jobs open to international markets, which clearly contrast with job positions in the private sector and domestic markets. In addition, the weight of autonomy and communicative skills in the workplace engendered increased levels of social reciprocity, creativity and libertarian values (Kitschelt, 1995).

What other factors interacted in the transformation of political behavior? Dalton et al. (1984) argued cognitive mobilization and increasing political sophistication debilitated social cleavages

and reinforced the role of value and issue voting. As a result, sophisticated citizens with no partisan ties with high political value would put more emphasis on *issues voting*. The explanation runs parallel to that of Inglehart but introduces the notion that socio-structural positions influence the formation of values.

At the expense of polarization based on social class, value orientations and issues became key to explain political attitudes, identities and voting behavior (Knutsen, 2018). Gender and education were the main drivers to acquire a set of values or another (Kitschelt, 1995). In consequence, highly educated citizens, part of the middle class, public sector employees and domestic market sector shifted towards the left in higher proportions (Ibid). Furthermore, there is literature suggesting the conflict in values has originated a new dimension of political competition (Kitschelt, 1995; Kriesi et al, 2008). In this scenario, the New Left and the Radical Right would be the main contenders along an axis of Liberalism/Cosmopolitanism – Authoritarianism/Communitarianism.

In connection with this idea, the strife over European integration, immigration or global competition may be part of a new cleavage over globalization or a “*transnational cleavage*” (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al, 2008). As a subversive force, globalization has impacted Western politics at three levels - societal conflicts (structure and political arenas), political parties and party families, and party systems (structural properties and competition dynamics) (Kriesi et al, 2008).

From a comparative perspective, Knutsen (1995, 2018) found out that both “Old Politics” and “New Politics” were still important to voter choice in Europe, being the orientations of the first category less salient but more affected by socio-structural characteristics. Among those, social class and religiousness stood out. Finally, “*pure value*” voting was the most extended model in Western Europe, while “*cleavage voting*” (social structure through value orientations to the ballot) and structural voting followed (Ibid).

Additionally, Kriesi (1998) contended that the reduced importance of traditional cleavages did not necessarily imply that social divisions did not matter anymore to political behavior. Indeed, traditional cleavages did actively contribute the political articulation of both values of “New Politics” and the post-industrial class structure. Rovny and Polck (2019) linked the strength of religious conflict with the variant correlation of cultural and economic dimensions across party systems.

Even though the conventional consensus was the fact that social structure had declined in its importance in determining vote, other perspectives presented the issue differently (Knutsen, 2018). Kitschelt and Inglehart argued social structure affected voting behavior differently because there had been changes in both the preferences of voters and in the conflict dimension. On the

other hand, Stubager (2013) and Oesch (2015) underlined theories emphasizing social class and education as class variables part of the cleavage between the New Left and the Radical Right. Alongside with this element, libertarian – authoritarian values and voting support for these platforms constitute the core of this reinvigorated cultural axis (Knutsen, 2018).

To sum up, Western European electoral competition is played along two (or three) fields – “Old Politics” and “New Politics” (“*Transnational Politics*”). On the one hand, the former field relates to issues of economic redistribution, the welfare state and religious/moral debates which “*capture the essence of the traditional lines of conflict in industrial society*” (Ibid, p. 13). On the other hand, the latter field connects with conflicts over values embedded in post-industrial societies (Ibid).

Therefore, obtaining more information regarding the vote to social democratic parties entails examining the articulated logic of the adaptation of socialist parties to a new landscape. Substantial shifts in the occupational structure, the increased autonomy of women, LGBT+ rights and the proliferation of alternative lifestyles, the expansion of higher education, European integration, immigration flows, and shrinking budgets and soaring debt conform the big picture social democracy faces in contemporary Europe. Next section explains the formation of socialist parties and their subsequent electoral strategies.

2.2. The reconfiguration of socialist bases

2.2.1. What is the Left? Class *cleavage* and electoral competition

In his important work, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980*, Bartolini (2000) analyzed the evolution of the different political groups tied to socialism. In his work, both social democratic and communist parties were included in the “Left” category, while other leftist parties were excluded. In spite of existing differences among the selected cases, all of these political platforms originated thanks to the enfranchisement and mobilization of the working class, product of the Industrial Revolution.

The same author drew on the work of Rokkan to distinguish the five phases of the class cleavage formation, which we summarized in three steps. First, dissimilarities in interest and/or ideology linked to the dynamics of modernization originated oppositions. Second, public policy conflicts arose once centralized rule is established. Third, sets of political entrepreneurs allied to obtain support for their preferred policies; they chose to rely on existing communities and associations or set up specific organizations. Finally, they selected an arena of confrontation, either participating in liberal democracy or pursuing direct action (Ibid).

Chiefly, class *per se* originated from the interaction of industrial social stratification, “*politicization, electoral mobilization, and democratization*” (Ibid, p.18). To put it another way, the advent of capitalism reshaped European societies and set the objective social conditions of socio-economic differences. But the crystallization of class as a social category through which individuals could be politically mobilized would have never occurred if political entrepreneurs had not used their political agency.

As political actors acted and processes developed within nation-states, each social democratic party adopted different structures, commitments, and approximations to the relationship with democracy and capitalism. In this sense, the counter-hegemonic strategy pursued by Nordic countries and the SPD in Germany, which drew on strong trade unions, Marxist ideology and perspectives to overcome capitalism perceived the best dividends (Ross, 2013).

Essentially, social democratic parties relied upon the mobilization of class to fight for socio-economic equality. “*Socialism was the telos, universal suffrage was to be the instrument*” (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986, p.1). However, how did the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies affect their mobilization strategies?

2.2.2. Maximizing and molding the electoral coalition

Przeworski (1985) contended that the reformist strategy within capitalism and democracy did not necessarily lead to socialism, but to gradualism instead. Indeed, these institutions spearheaded the fight to achieve political power through access to parliaments. Social democratic parties had become electoral machines. Thus, subsequent movements subordinated to the logic of parliamentarism looking to maximize seats. Emphasis on equality, education, employment and healthcare displaced the revolutionary rhetoric of abolishing social classes, exploitation and alienation of previous eras (Ibid).

As electoral maximizing platforms, socialist parties faced a disjunctive - being homogenous parties with small chances of winning or expanding outside the confines of the working-class (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). Whether or not class is salient for individuals is the consequence of the strategies designed by parties in the left spectrum. The search for coalitions encompassing the middle classes and women ensued through policies and symbols which pointed towards the political organization of “*the People*” (Ibid).

Capitalism has certainly demonstrated its flexibility in accommodating the reforms pushed by socialists. As we already mentioned, Kitschelt and other authors have shown that occupational stratification has long changed since the heyday of social democracy. Other theories were the

pretended embourgeoisement of the working classes, which Goldthorpe et al. (1967) found it was not as strong as the proponents of the theory implied were. Indeed, social class went beyond income and consumption patterns and the rapprochement had to do with “*conceptual models of collectivity and individuality*” (Goldthorpe et al, 1969, as quoted in Calderón, 2016, p.154).

In the case of Spain, Beramendi and Bonillas (2001) found that socio-structural changes associated to post-industrialization and the surge of the new middle classes oriented the Spanish socialist party PSOE to mold its bases with redistributive and labor market public policies. Contrarily, Caínzos (2001) casted doubts on this proposition by arguing that class voting has been a constant in Spain since 1986.

García de Polavieja (2001) insisted on not forgetting about the ideological mechanisms imbricated in class voting and the importance of controlling class by factors such as the subjective feeling of family income. While individuals voting PSOE were more likely to vote on identity grounds and be skilled manual workers, those supporters of the conservative Partido Popular (PP) were more likely to check the performance of parties and be more popular among the service class.

Leftist parties, including socialist platforms, embraced the reinforcement of the welfare state alongside cultural liberalism in dimensions such as immigration and multiculturalism (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). These political platforms faced potential losses of segments of manual workers and clerks due to the *issue specialization* of the radical right on Europeanism, multiculturalism and immigration (Ibid). In order to better understand political competition, we proceed to review literature on class, education and gender.

2.3. Class

Alford, Lipset, Inglehart and Sainsbury were among the most important scholars arguing that class voting was experiencing a decline in post-World War II Western countries (As quoted in Evans, 1999a). But this thesis might have never been true (Weakliem and Heath, 1999), as the patterns of vote according to class have experimented varied evolutions across time and countries (Evans, 1999b).

Drawing on different contributions such as those of Goldthorpe (1996) and Manza et al. (1995), Evans (1999a) provided five possible explanations about why class might have ceased to be important – the embourgeoisement of the working class, the proletarianization of white-collars and the extension of intra and intergenerational mobility; new identities and social markers, such as gender, ethnicity or public/private sector; cognitive mobilization and increasing educational

formation; rising importance of values and its imbrication with social class; and the relative decline of the working class in society.

Niewubeerta and De Graaf (1999) examined the evolution of 20 countries over 45 years and found that countries where class voting was stronger after World War II experienced substantial declines in levels of class voting. Nonetheless, Evans (1999b) pointed out at the deficits of their work to conclude that the heterogeneity of party systems across countries might possibly lead to diverse incentives to integrate the structure of leftist parties to socioeconomic transformations, as outlined at the start of the research.

Importantly, the changes in the occupational structure transformed traditional class voting (Kitschelt, 1995). Indeed, the new middle classes were internally divided due to opposing value orientations, which translated into different political choices (Kriesi, 1998). This heterogenous group was defined by *“the exercise of delegated authority or control over organizational assets, on the one hand, and expertise skills or credentials, on the other hand”* (Ibid, p. 168). Socio-cultural professionals would be leaning more towards the left due to their strong stance for individual autonomy and egalitarianism, while managers would prioritize free markets and paternalistic organizations (Ibid).

In a comparative study across 15 Western democracies in the period 1960-2006, Jansen et al. (2013) showed that class voting had decreased in an identifiable trend. However, it is important to underscore the impact of education and the fact that the decline was not linear in form. Likewise, Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) contended that social democratic parties compensated the loss of support among the traditional working-class in both absolute and relative terms with increased participation of the new middle classes. Since the 1990s, the composition of these political platforms has undergone dramatic changes across European welfare regimes, especially in social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal regimes.

Two social groups stand out as distinguished supporters of the left and the right in the context of “New Politics” (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). The authors contended that sociocultural professionals¹ are an electoral “preserve” of the left; conversely, large employers, managers and liberal professionals are so for the right. On the other hand, clerks² are an open competition area for all political platforms. Furthermore, the working-class is a dispute stronghold between the

¹ *“Professionals in healthcare, education, social welfare and the media”* (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018, p.787)

² Category composed by two kinds of class - *“technical professionals and technicians”* and *“office clerks”* (Ibid).

radical right and the left, particularly among production worker. Small business owners (“Old middle class”) are between the center-right and the radical right (Ibid).

Knutsen (2018) signaled that class voting remained strong in several Western European countries, while at the same time the traditional Left-Right voting had lost steam. Indeed, differences across classes were more marked among the parties of the New Left and the New Right and less pronounced in traditional party families such as social democrats or conservatives. Structural developments paired with the formation of new parties had generated contemporary patterns of competition casting doubt on the *dealignment* perspective regarding social cleavages (Ibid).

We can conclude that the nature of class voting has experienced a transformation with the rise of issues from the cultural axis. Apart from including social class in the analysis of socialist voters, an approximation to education and gender in their role of shaping values and preferences must also be made to capture in a satisfactory way the imbricated processes intervening in their formation.

2.4. Education

Educational attainment has usually been associated with higher participation (Marshall, 2016), yet its effect on voting has experienced a rise in recent decades. Some difficulties in capturing the effect of education in political behavior stems from the fact that individuals are also influenced by other factors apart from educational attainment, and the fact that it education itself is already the product of other control variables (Ibid).

Western societies saw liberalization processes thanks to the growth of higher education and the proliferation of universalistic values, generating new generations more culturally tolerant and open to foreign cultures thanks to trained cognitive and language skills (Bornschiefer and Kriesi, 2015). However, Inglehart (2018) underlined the fact that education must also be observed as the consequence of growing up under secure conditions in the early stages of life. While the cognitive effect of education is likely to be permanent, the feelings of security and autonomy may not (Ibid).

According to Stubager (2013), the dimension of conflict authoritarianism – libertarianism constituted an *educational cleavage*. Beyond being an economic conflict, the same author suggested that the answer lied within socialization in different educational milieus (Stubager, 2009). The difference is not economic but lies in values themselves. In connection with this idea, educational attainment and social class would be the main factors in the cultural and economic axis, respectively (Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2015). The authors analyzed ESS round 1 (2002-3)

and demonstrated that harsher immigration policies were connected to material/economic deprivation in lower education strata. Further, they concluded that educational level impacted on political preferences because they were linked with material positions. Knutsen (2018) validated this conclusion suggesting that highest educated voters opted for Green, Liberal and Left Socialist options, while Social Democrats, the Radical Right and Agrarian parties were the main parties of lower educated citizens.

Education is one of the top variables in contemporary political competition. Its continued expansion brings along cultural and intellectual patterns which penetrate all aspects of life. As political debates shift towards socio-cultural issues, education also influences more voting (Kitschelt, 1995). More intellectual demanding jobs offered in dynamic workplaces, notably in client-interaction jobs and the personal service sector, promote political calls for individual self-realization and better democratic procedures and leave apart economic and security issues (Ibid). In this quest, gender is another component which importantly influences the positioning on socio-cultural issues.

2.5. Gender

Do women participate less in politics? If so, do they align more towards the left or the right? These debates started in the context of the United States of America. In Europe, there was little attention to gender differences in voting patterns. Women voted more conservative during the first half of the 20th century, while comparative studies in the continent have shown inconsistencies in the recent past years (Giger, 2009). Their lack of involvement in paid work, associated with more interaction with trade unions, plus religious ties complicated their adherence to socialist parties (Kittilson, 2016).

Employing data from the World Values Surveys of the early 1980s and early and mid-1990s, Inglehart and Norris (2000) found women had moved to the left in relation to men. Unlike the 1980s, a decade later several post-industrial societies had developed a modern gender gap similar to that of the United States. The authors suggested cultural differences in values were the cause of the new gender gap. Other factors were higher employment levels of women, increasing access to education, changing attributes of modern families and secularization processes (Giger, 2009). As it could be logically derived from the cultural modernization theoretical basis, the intensity of differences in voting behavior was more marked among younger generations.

Giger (2009) demonstrated through a cross-national analysis involving 12 European countries across 25 years signs of a gender gap in Europe. The salience of value orientations and issues

in the renewed cultural cleavage presented differences between men and women that resulted in different political choices, supporting the thesis of gained autonomy of women coming from expanded female labor participation (Ibid). Nonetheless, Knusten (2018) detected that gender was the least influential predictor compared to other socio-structural factors.

Likewise, Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014) compared 25 countries using data from the European Values Study (2008) and yielded similar conclusions. Socio-structural and cultural factors related to attitudes (macro level) and individual factors (micro level) would explain the variance across countries regarding the modern gender gap. Across regions, Western countries presented a wider gap favoring the left, while in post-communist countries they favored the right. Other explanations at the national level have questioned the prominence of the modernization theory and proposed government socialization instead (Shorrocks, 2016).

To sum up, women have undergone a two-generations empowerment process thanks to increased access to higher education, higher paid work rates, secularization and more exposure to the service economy. Nowadays, women are majoritarian in tertiary education in most Western countries, increasingly present in national parliaments and holding positions of influence (Inglehart, 2018). Linking these two aspects, we conclude that women as a collective group have gained autonomy in all areas of life. We suggest this fact will impact the formation of singular and differentiated political views on both the economy and cultural issues.

3. Hypotheses

After the review of literature, we proceed to present our hypothesis with respect to the analysis of the vote to social democratic parties in the period 2002 – 2010.

Hypothesis 1 – The ideological model explains the vote to social democracy better than the socio-structural model.

Sub-hypothesis 1.1 – Women vote social democratic parties at higher levels than males.

Sub-hypothesis 1.2 – Strong redistribution preferences are the better predictor of voting to social democratic parties within values and issues preferences.

Sub-hypothesis 1.3 – Cultural liberalism leads to higher vote to social democratic parties.

Hypothesis 2 – Social class is an important factor explaining the vote to socialist parties.

Sub-hypothesis 2.1 – In comparison to Semi-Unskilled manual workers, all other social classes vote in lower numbers for social democratic parties.

Sub-hypothesis 2.2 – Skilled manual workers are the second group most supportive of these political options.

Sub-hypothesis 2.3 – Routine clerical/sales workers are the occupational group outside of the working class which votes more to social democratic parties, followed by Lower Service workers.

Hypothesis 3 – Educational attainment affects negatively the vote to socialist parties.

Sub-hypothesis 3.1 – Individuals with the lowest level of educational attainment (ISCED 0-1) vote socialist parties the most.

Hypothesis 4 – The effect of educational attainment on the vote to socialist parties is not equal to that of social class.

Hypothesis 5 – Socio-structural values directly affect the positioning on issues and value preferences. Social class is more prevalent in redistribution issues, while education is more salient in cultural issues.

Sub-hypothesis 5.1 - Semi-Unskilled manual, Skilled manual and Routine clerical/sales workers favor redistribution actions the most.

Sub-hypothesis 5.2 – Lower Service, Higher Service and Routine clerical/sales workers favor cultural liberalism the most.

Sub-hypothesis 5.3 – Higher Service and Lower service workers have the highest trust in the European Parliament and the strongest belief that immigrants contribute positively to the national economy.

Sub-hypothesis 5.4 – Increasing educational attainment is linked to less intense redistribution preferences as well as more cultural liberalism and a positive view of the immigration onto the economy.

Sub-hypothesis 5.5 – Females support redistribution and cultural liberalism more than men.

4. Data and operationalization

In order to carry out our research, we worked with the first five rounds of the individual-level data of the *European Social Survey* (ESS). Since 2001, the group of academics behind the project creates a database every two years based on presential interviews with different cross-sectional samples. In relation to our project, its usefulness rested in the fact that it contains information regarding “*the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations.*” (ESS-ERIC, 2019).

Our pool of data consisted of 163,339 individuals from 17 countries corresponding to the fieldwork of 2002 - 2010. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia were the countries included. Although initially included in the project, the Czech Republic, Italy or Greece were finally excluded due to missing country files in some years. Also, we merged the files of Austria corresponding to rounds 4 and 5 with all other data from these times.

Regarding the rationale for the time selection, we used the principle of continuity of explanatory variables contained in the models. Specifically, the change in variable regarding occupation from *iscoco* to *isco08* presented problematic aspects. As occupation categories changed and there was no exact equivalence between those of the former and the latter, we decided to encompass only those ESS rounds including the occupation variable *iscoco*.

Instead of taking the approach of considering all leftist parties and creating a dichotomous variable Left – Right, we drew on the work of Escalona et al. (2013) to select the following parties: SPÖ (Austria), PS and sp.a (Belgium), SD (Denmark), SDP (Finland), PS (France), SPD (Germany), MSZP (Hungary), LP (Ireland), PD (Italy), PvdA (the Netherlands), SLD (Polonia), PS (Portugal), SD (Slovenia), PSOE (Spain), SAP (Sweden) and LP (United Kingdom). Regarding Switzerland and Norway, we choose the social democratic party in the ESS rounds as category of reference.

The dichotomic dependent variable was the product of the aggrupation of a dummy variable applied to socialist voters of the different countries. As the period extended eight years, there might be several variables for the same country with different values. Movements and disruption in political systems throughout this period of time seem to be the cause behind these changes.

Once all dummies were created, we established the criteria to discriminate between social democratic voters (1) and those other individuals who did not because they voted for other options, could not or did not vote, or didn't provide an answer (0). Shortly afterwards, we converted

the filter itself into the new variable *Socialist dummy*. With the dependent variable already constructed, we selected those individuals who had voted in the last national election (*vote* = 1).

In the process of constructing the dependent variable, we did not include nationalist or regional socialist platforms, the New Left and communist, socio-liberal or anti-EU left-wing parties. The high number of observations gave us room to take this methodological step to constrict the dependent variable to these parties, centering our research object more precisely. Alongside other information, the variation of names and equivalences in political parties across the collected rounds are explained and detailed in the table below.

Table 1. Countries included in the analysis with party variables, national social democratic parties, results average (2002-2010, in percentage) and socialist voters in ESS rounds (2002-2010, in percentage)

	Party variables	Socialist Party	Results average (2002-2010)	Socialist voters in ESS 1 - 5 (2002 - 2010)
Austria	prtvat (ESS 1 - 2) prtvaat (ESS 3 - 5)	SPO	33.70	25.60
Belgium	prtvbe (ESS 1) prtvabe (ESS 2 - 3) prvtcbe (ESS 4 - 5)	sp.a (FL) PS (WA)	24.50	22.90
Finland	prvtfi (ESS 1 - 3) prvtafi (ESS 4) prvtbfi (ESS 5)	SDP	21.67	21.80
France	prvtfr (ESS1 - 2) prvtafr (ESS 3) prvtbfr (ESS 4 - 5)	PS	24.40	28.70
Switzerland	prvtch (ESS 1 - 2) prvtach (ESS 3) prvtbch (ESS 4) prvttech (ESS 5)	SP	21.45	21.00
Germany	prtvde1 (ESS 1) prtvade1 (ESS 2) prtbvde1 (ESS 3 - 4) prtvcede1 (ESS 5)	SPD	31.90	33.70

	Party variables	Socialist Party	Results average (2002-2010)	Socialist voters in ESS 1 - 5 (2002 - 2010)
Denmark	prvttdk (ESS 1 - 2) prvtadk (ESS 3) prvtbdk (ESS 4 - 5)	SD	25.80	26.00
Spain	prvttes (ESS 1) prvttaes (ESS 2 - 3) prvtbes (ESS 4 - 5)	PSOE	40.20	37.40
United Kingdom	prvtggb (ESS 1 - 3 & 5) prvtggb (ESS 4)	Labour	37.95	40.20
Hungary	prvtthu (ESS 1 - 2) prvtahu (ESS 3) prvtbhu (ESS 4) prvtchu (ESS 5)	MSZP	42.63	32.10
Ireland	prvtie (ESS 1 - 4) prvtaie (ESS 5)	Labour	10.77	10.20
Netherlands	prvtntl (ESS 1) prvtanl (ESS 2) prvtbnl (ESS 3) prvtcnl (ESS 4) prvtndl (ESS 5)	PvdA	21.18	20.80
Norway	prvtno (ESS 1 - 4) prvtano (ESS 5)	DNA	30.78	30.80
Poland	prvtpl (ESS 1 - 2) prvtapl (ESS 3) prvtbpl (ESS 4 - 5)	SLD LiD	21.83	18.30
Portugal	prvtpt (ESS 1 - 2) prvtapt (ESS 3 - 4) prvtbpt (ESS 5)	PS	39.79	32.20
Sweden	prvtse (ESS 1 - 4) prvtase (ESS 5)	SAP	37.42	32.10
Slovenia	prvtsti (ESS 1) prvtasi (ESS 2) prvtbsi (ESS 3) prvtcsi (ESS 4 - 5)	ZLSD SD	20.31	15.30

4.1. Methods and variables

Our research employed binary logistic regressions to predict the effects of socio-structural and ideological and value variables on the likelihood to vote for social democratic parties and to test the interaction between education and social class. Additionally, we also devised a multinomial logistic regression to examine the relationship between socio-structural variables and values and issue preferences. The selection of variables to construct each model followed the principles of continuity, comparability and/or convertibility to equivalent measures to contribute to the cross-national comparison.

After applying the filter of vote in the last national election and the combined weights, the number of observations included in the models was 110,144 individuals. Combining post-stratification and population weights, we weighted the data to get accurate coefficients and standard errors. Missing values for the different variables were excluded when performing the models. In the following sections, we proceed to look at the attributes of data included in the research as well as the descriptive statistics.

4.1.1. Socio-structural model

Social class

Since our interest was to capture the dimension of social class and not only occupation, we transformed the variable *iscoco* (Occupation, ISCO88) into the Erikson-Goldthorpe scheme. The framework of Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) guided us in the assignation of values to reduce the number of categories to eleven, even though only seven of them were present in the data. The table below summarizes the categories and their composition. *VIIa. Semi-unskilled manual workers* are taken as reference category.

Table 2. ECP Class Categories and internal composition

ECP Class Categories	Composition
I. Higher Service	Professionals, large enterprise employers and higher managers (>10 subordinates)
II. Lower Service	Associate professionals, lower managers (1-10 subordinates), higher sales
III. Routine clerical/sales workers	Routine clerical and sales workers
VI. Skilled Manual	Craft workers, some skilled service, and skilled machine operators
VIIa. Semi-Unskilled manual	Machine operators, elementary laborers, elementary sales and services
VIIb. Farm workers	Farm workers, irrespective of skill level; also family farm workers
IVc. Farmers/Farm managers	Self-employed and supervisory farm workers, irrespective of skill level

Note: Self-elaborated table reproducing the information in Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996, p. 214).

Education level

The education categorical variable corresponds to the maximum level of education achieved measured within the ISCED framework. National references of education were available, but the standardized variable *edulv1a* permitted an easier usage to make cross-national comparisons. We only included the references ISCED 0-1, ISCED 2, ISCED 3, ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6 of the categorical variable. Minoritarian responses including “Other” were declared missing.

The correspondence of the included references is the following: “*Less than lower secondary education*” (ISCED 0-1), “*Lower secondary education completed*” (ISCED 2), “*Upper secondary education completed*” (ISCED 3), “*Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed*” (ISCED 4) and “*Tertiary education completed*” (ISCED 5-6).

We also recoded the variable *edulv1a* to convert the choices ISCED level into individual dummies to test the effect of the interaction of education and social class. Specifically, our interest is to focus on the differences among Semi-unskilled manual and Skilled manual workers and Farm workers in ISCED 0-1; Semi-unskilled manual and Skilled manual workers, Routine clerical/sales workers and Farm workers in ISCED 2; all groups in ISCED 3; and Routine clerical/sales workers, Lower Service and Higher Service in ISCED 5-6.

Age

Continuous measure corresponding to the variable *agea*.

Gender

Categorical variable *gndr* classifies individuals as “*Male*” (reference category), “*Female*” and “*Don’t answer/Don’t Know*”. For the purposes of our research, the latter values were declared missing due to their irrelevance.

Member of trade union

Categorical variable *mbtru*. Individuals are classified according to their membership in trade unions, which is summarized in the categories of current members (reference category), former members and no membership ever.

Religious degree

Categorical variable *rlgdgr* transformed into continuous, where 0 means the individual is not religious at all and 10 a maximum religiosity.

Feeling with respect to family income

Categorical variable *hincfel*. Individuals are classified according to whether they are “*Living comfortably on present income*” (reference category), “*Coping on present income*”, “*Difficult on present income*” or “*Very difficult on present income*”.

4.1.2. Ideological and values model

Left – Right self-positioning

Categorical variable *lrscale* and converted it into a continuous measure. The scale ranges from 0 (Left) and 10 (Right).

Redistribution

Since the pursuit of equality is one of the main principles of European social democracy, the redistribution of wealth can be expected to be at the center of its program. The categorical variable *hincdif* presents a Likert scale classifying individuals according to their degree of support to the action of the government to reduce income differences. The categories encompassed are “*Strongly Agree*” (reference category), “*Agree*”, “*Neither agree nor disagree*”, and “*Strongly Disagree*”. The variable was rescaled to continuous and inverted its values to offer a better lecture of results from the model.

Cultural liberalism

Women and minorities have been important targets in the ampliation of electoral boundaries of socialist parties. As previously detailed, the new middle classes are particularly keen on these discourses. The categorical measure *freehms* classifies individuals with the same Likert scale as before according to their responses to the right of gays and lesbians to live their life as they wish. The variable went through the same reescalation process as *Redistribution*.

Europeanism

Socialist parties have generally favored Europeanism as a tool to protect key European industries and take part in international forums to build synergies, such as the European Parliament. Categorical value *trstep* was transformed into a continuous measure, where 0 means “No confidence at all” in the European Parliament and 10 maximum confidence. The variable was rescaled into 5 categories to be included in the multinomial model in the following way - 1 (0-2), 2 (3-4), 3 (5-6), 4 (7-8), and 5 (9-10) (*trstep_recode*).

Immigration

The impact of immigration on the economy is a key dimension since it connects with *issues* such as redistribution, racial/ethnic tensions and welfare chauvinism. Categorical value *imbgeco* was transformed into a continuous measure, where 0 means “Worse for the economy” and 10 “Better for the economy”. We effectuated the same conversion operation as in *Europeanism*.

4.2. Descriptive Statistics

Socialist voters constitute a minority within the cohort with 34,078 individuals (30.9%), being the 76,102 individuals left voters of other political platforms (69.1%). As we demonstrated in Table 1, the electoral strength of social democratic parties across countries and time differ. The United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Hungary present more socialists individuals with respect to the total number of voters. On the contrary, Ireland or Slovenia have fewer observations. Regarding time evolution, Figure 1 shows how socialist voters saw a timid increase from ESS 1 to ESS 2. Contrarily, the following round reflects a steady decrease in the number of individuals who chose social democratic parties in the ballot box at their last national election.

4.2.1. Socio-structural variables

Social class

As Figure 2 and Figure 3 show, European socialist parties in Europe receive more support from Semi-unskilled manual, Skilled manual and Routine clerical/sales workers. Conversely, Lower and Higher Service workers alongside Farm workers and Farmers/Farm managers form the constituencies of other parties. The sum of the first three categories is 6.85 percentage points higher for socialist parties.

The evolution of individuals from social groups voting socialist parties across rounds offers interesting remarks. As detailed in Table 3, Routine clerical/sales workers decrease their vote to socialist parties the least. The working-class falls considerably more than twice as the former, close to the percentage change of Lower Service workers. Remaining groups defect in even greater numbers, closer to a 30% decrease in the period.

Education

Socialist voters tend to be more highly concentrated in lower (ISCED 0-1) and lower-medium (ISCED 2) education levels (See Figure 4). There are slight percentage differences across medium-to-higher standard education attainment levels, but individuals in these groups manifest less voting behavior linked to social democratic parties.

On the other hand, it is interesting to take a look at the interplay between education and the social class. As Figure 5 demonstrates, the difference among groups is bigger in individuals with ISCED 0-1, ISCED 3 and ISCED 5-6. Figure 6 provides more detailed information on this issue: ISCED 0-1, ISCED 2 and ISCED 3 are more widespread among Farm workers, Skilled manual workers, Semi-unskilled manual workers and Routine clerical/sales workers. Conversely, ISCED 5-6 is more widespread among Lower Service and above all other categories Higher Service workers.

Gender

Women vote more socialist parties than men. Taking all rounds together, the gender gap results is equal to 0.28 percentage points (See Table 4). However, taking a look at data broken down by ESS rounds reveals discontinuities. There is a gap which reaches its maximum in ESS 4 (2008) with a difference of 1.8 percentage points between man and women, which is reduced to 0.7 in the last round. On the other hand, ESS rounds 2 and 3 show more men than women voting socialist parties by margins of 0.6 and 0.9 pp, respectively.

Member of a trade union

Trade unionists favor social democratic parties in greater numbers than previous members and individuals who have never been affiliated. It is important to remark that the difference between the current and former members is considerably lower than with respect to the third category (See Figure 7).

Age

There is no appreciable difference in age terms between socialist and non-socialist voters. For both groups, the median is 50 years old and distribution across quartiles is the same (See Figure 8).

Religious level

Socialist voters are less religious than other individuals who voted other political platforms. Even though the median is 5 for both groups on a scale 0-10, the former concentrates 75% of individuals below 6. Conversely, the latter extends itself to higher levels of self-declared religiosity (See Figure 9).

Figure 1. Evolution of the percentage of socialist voters and voters of other parties




Figure 2. Class composition of the vote of socialist and other parties




Figure 3. Social democratic voters across social classes




Table 3. Evolution of individuals from different social classes voting socialist parties

	Socialist vote					% change ESS1 - ESS5
	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	ESS4	ESS5	
I. Higher Service	32.4%	32.9%	27.7%	24.6%	21.1%	- 34.87%
II. Lower service	32.1%	34.0%	30.0%	27.6%	23.4%	- 27.10%
III. Routine clerical/sales	33.2%	34.3%	30.6%	31.0%	28.8%	- 13.25%
VI. Skilled manual	36.3%	36.5%	33.7%	30.5%	26.6%	- 26.72%
VIIa. Semi-Unskilled manual	40.1%	40.5%	35.9%	37.8%	29.0%	- 27.68%
VIIb. Farm workers	24.1%	21.9%	18.7%	19.1%	15.1%	- 37.34%
IVc. Farmers/Farm mangers	20.6%	22.8%	11.6%	14.3%	13.5%	- 34.46%

Figure 4. Social democratic voters across the highest education level achieved




Figure 5. Educational composition of voters




Figure 6. Social classes by level of education




Table 4. Evolution of the vote to socialist groups by gender

	Socialist vote		
	Male	Female	Gender gap (Female as reference)
ESS 1	33.6%	34.0%	0.4 pp
ESS 2	35.0%	34.4%	- 0.60 pp
ESS 3	31.4%	30.5%	- 0.90 pp
ESS 4	29.0%	30.8%	1.80 pp
ESS 5	25.2%	25.9%	0.70 pp
Total	30.80%	31.08%	0.28 pp

Figure 7. Social democratic voters across present and former membership in trade unions




Figure 8. Age and vote in last national election





Figure 9. Religiosity degree and vote in last national election



4.2.2. Ideological variables

Ideological self-positioning (Left – Right)

Socialist voter position themselves more to the Left than the rest of the cohort. While 4 is the mean value for the former group, 5 is so for the latter. On the other hand, quartiles reveal the concentration of socialist voters around values 3 and 5, while other voters gather around values 5 and 7 (See Figure 10).

Redistribution – Government role to prevent inequality

The strongest the preference for the intervention of government to palliate income inequality, the higher the propensity to vote socialist. Categories “*Agree*” and “*Strongly agree*” exhibit similar results (See Figure 11).

Cultural liberalism – Right of gays and lesbians to live freely

Socialist voters are more concentrated in higher levels of *Cultural Liberalism* (“*Agree*” and “*Strongly agree*”). Categories “*Neither agree nor disagree*”, “*Disagree*” or “*Strongly disagree*” exhibit similar results (See Figure 12).

Immigration – Perception of the impact on the economy

Socialist voters are slightly less pessimistic about the negative impact of immigration onto the national economy. Both groups consider immigration to be neutral (5) as mean value, but there is an important part of non-socialist voters who express their rejection of immigration as a source of wealth (See Figure 13).

Europeanism – Trust in the European Parliament

At first sight, socialist and non-socialist voters show no differences in their *Europeanism*. Their mean level of trust in the European Parliament is equal to 5, with 25% of the people concentrated between 3 to 5 and another 25% in 5 to 6 (See Figure 14).

Figure 10. Ideology self-positioning and vote in last national election




Figure 11. Redistribution preferences and socialist vote in last national election




Figure 12. Cultural liberalism and socialist vote in last national election




Figure 13. Immigration and vote in last national election





Figure 14. Europeanism and vote in last national election



5. Results

5.1. Socio-structural model

We have created three different models to test whether socio-structural characteristics influence the propensity to vote socialist parties. In Model 1, *Social class*, *Education level* and *Feeling about family income* are the only variables taken into account. In Model 2, *Gender* and *Age* are added. In Model 3, *Membership in trade unions* and *Religious degree* are incorporated. In Appendix A, we have included plots of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables.

Social Class

Social class is statistically significant to account for the vote of social democratic parties at p-value < 0.01. Skilled manual workers vote social democratic parties the most after Semi-unskilled manual (reference category) and Routine clerical/sales workers. On the other hand, Lower Service and Higher Service employees vote socialist .738 and .786 times in comparison to the reference category with other factors held constant, respectively. Farm workers and Farmers/Farm Managers are the least likely to vote social democratic parties. Finally, the coefficients of Routine clerical/sales and Higher Service change the most after incorporating membership in trade unions and religious degree into the models.

Education

Education is statistically significant at p-value < 0.01. As education level increases, the propension to vote socialist parties diminishes, except for a noticeable somewhat milder than expected effect at ISCED 4. Those with low-medium (ISCED 2) and advanced studies (ISCED 4 and 5-6) represent the segments less likely to vote socialist parties *ceteris paribus*. All categories get higher negative coefficients once membership in trade unions and religious degree are controlled for.

Gender

Gender is statistically significant at p-value < 0.01. Females vote socialist parties in higher numbers than men, up to 10.1% more *ceteris paribus*. It is significant only after entering membership in trade unions and religious degree into the model.

Age

No statistical significance of the variable *agea*.

Membership in a trade union

The present or former relationship with trade unions is statistically significant at $p\text{-value} < 0.01$. Former trade unionists vote slightly less socialist parties than current members (.813 times). Those individuals who have never taken part in associations of workers exhibit a marked rejection and vote socialist parties .598 times as the reference category.

Religious degree

Religiosity is statistically significant at $p\text{-value} < 0.01$. Higher religiousness leads to decreased support to social democratic parties up to 6.3% less by each unitary increase in religiosity (*ceteris paribus*).

Feeling about family income

The feeling about family income is statistically significant at $p\text{-value} < 0.01$. In comparison to the reference category (*“Living comfortably on present income”*), individuals with a more precarious situation vote socialist parties in a higher propension. Those who declare to be *“Difficult on present income”* or *“Very difficult on present income”* vote 17.3 and 20.9% more socialist parties than the reference category, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 1: Socio-structural Model

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social class			
- Higher Service	−0.328*** (0.029)	−0.324*** (0.030)	−0.303*** (0.030)
- Lower Service	−0.244*** (0.023)	−0.241*** (0.023)	−0.240*** (0.024)
- Routine clerical/sales	−0.201*** (0.021)	−0.200*** (0.022)	−0.186*** (0.022)
- Skilled manual	−0.131*** (0.025)	−0.127*** (0.025)	−0.138*** (0.025)
- Farm workers	−0.755*** (0.041)	−0.755*** (0.042)	−0.651*** (0.042)
- Farmers/Farm Managers	−0.880*** (0.143)	−0.875*** (0.143)	−0.870*** (0.144)
Education level			
- ISCED 2	−0.172*** (0.026)	−0.177*** (0.027)	−0.231*** (0.027)
- ISCED 3	−0.206*** (0.025)	−0.212*** (0.027)	−0.308*** (0.027)
- ISCED 4	−0.196*** (0.042)	−0.203*** (0.043)	−0.274*** (0.044)
- ISCED 5-6	−0.214*** (0.027)	−0.223*** (0.029)	−0.332*** (0.029)

Female		0.009 (0.015)	0.097*** (0.016)
Age		-0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0001 (0.001)
Membership in a trade union			
- Former member of a trade union			-0.206*** (0.023)
- Never a trade unionist			-0.513*** (0.021)
Religious degree			-0.065*** (0.003)
Feeling about family income			
- Coping on present income	0.092*** (0.017)	0.093*** (0.017)	0.085*** (0.017)
- Difficult on present income	0.162*** (0.025)	0.160*** (0.025)	0.160*** (0.025)
- Very difficult on present income	0.201*** (0.044)	0.190*** (0.044)	0.190*** (0.044)
Constant	-0.662*** (0.062)	-0.648*** (0.070)	0.014 (0.074)
Observations	106,633	106,304	105,327
Log Likelihood	-50,883.140	-50,747.290	-49,838.260
Akaike Inf. Crit.	101,834.300	101,566.600	99,754.510
Cox and Snell R Sq.	.042	.042	.055
Nagelkerke R Sq.	.059	.059	.078

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

5.1.1. Interactions between *Education level* and *Social class*

In this subsection, we examine the results of the interaction between social class and educational attainment with the same variables as in the first socio-structural model. Predicted probabilities are summarized in Figures 15 – 18, while the different models with the diverse ISCED dummies are available at Appendix B.

ISCED 0-1

Semi-Unskilled manual workers with “*Less than secondary education*” (ISCED 0-1) are the group with higher predicted probabilities to vote socialist parties, closely followed by Skilled manual workers. As the latter group, Farm workers exhibit relevant differences between those individuals with ISCED 0-1 and those with higher levels of education. Last but not least, less educated Farmers and Farm managers show high volatility (See Figure 15).

ISCED 2

Once again, Semi-Unskilled manual workers with “*Lower secondary education completed*” (ISCED2) show the highest propensity to vote socialist parties. In the same fashion, Farm workers with ISCED2 manifest more chances to opt for social democratic platforms versus other members

of the group with different education levels. On the contrary, Routine clerical/sales workers and Skilled manual workers with ISCED 2 are less likely to be socialist voters, exhibiting similar probabilities (See Figure 16).

ISCED 3

Skilled manual workers are the group with higher predicted probabilities to vote socialist parties, surpassing Semi-Unskilled manual workers. Afterwards, Higher Service, Lower Service and Routine clerical/sales workers follow them closely. Both Higher and Lower Service workers vote socialist parties in higher numbers than in other educational levels, while otherwise holds true for the other groups. Finally, there is a certain convergence within these groups at this educational attainment level (See Figure 17).

ISCED 5-6

Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6) is particularly extended among Higher Service, Lower Service and Routine clerical/sales workers. According to the results, the first two groups with this education level vote less socialist parties than the rest of individuals of the same group. On the contrary, Routine clerical/sales workers with ISCED 5-6 do the opposite and have the highest probabilities to vote socialist parties outside of the working-class groups (See Figure 18).

General effects and positioning of social classes across categories

According to Table 5, the lowest levels of educational attainment have a positive effect throughout the categories in ISCED 0-1 and in all of them except for Lower Service, Routine clerical/sales and Skilled manual workers in ISCED 2. In ISCED 3, the effects are positive for the two higher strata categories of Higher and Lower Service. Finally, ISCED 5 is so for Semi-unskilled manual workers and Routine clerical/sales workers.

Across the different levels of educational attainment, Semi-unskilled manual workers are always the top category (ISCED 0-1 and 5-6) or the second one (ISCED 2 and 3) in predicted probabilities to vote socialist parties (See Table 6). Likewise, Skilled manual workers situate themselves in second (ISCED 0-1), third (ISCED 2) and first (ISCED 3) place but fall to the 5th in ISCED 5-6. Routine clerical/sales workers follow a similar pattern, even though they do better in the highest category than in *Upper secondary education* (ISCED 3). Conversely, Higher Service and Lower Service have higher predicted probabilities of voting socialist in the former educational category.

Figure 15. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 0-1 and Social class




Figure 16. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 2 and Social class




Figure 17. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 3 and Social class




Figure 18. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by ISCED 5-6 and Social class




Table 5. Education dummies – Difference between dummy category (1) minus other education levels (0) in each ISCED category

Education dummies - Difference between dummy category (1) minus other education levels (0) in each ISCED category				
	ISCED 0-1	ISCED 2	ISCED 3	ISCED 5-6
Semi-unskilled manual	+	+	-	+
Higher Service	+	+	+	-
Lower Service	+	-	+	-
Routine clerical/sales	+	-	-	+
Skilled manual	+	-	-	-
Farm workers	+	+	-	-
Farmers/Farm managers*	+	+	-	=

*S.E. too big to make reliable causal inferences about the group.

Table 6. Education dummies – Compared position of social classes across predicted share of vote when dummy = 1

Education dummies - Compared position of social classes across predicted share of vote when dummy = 1				
	ISCED 0-1	ISCED 2	ISCED 3	ISCED 5-6
Semi-unskilled manual	1st	2nd	2nd	1st
Higher Service	4th	5th	3rd	4th
Lower Service	5th	6th	4th	3rd
Routine clerical/sales	3rd	4th	5th	2nd
Skilled manual	2nd	3rd	1st	5th
Farm workers	6th	7th	6th	7th
Farmers/Farm managers*	7th	1st	7th	6th

*S.E. too big to make reliable causal inferences about the group.

5.2. Ideological model

We have created three different models to test whether ideology and value preferences influence the propensity to vote socialist parties. In Model 1, *Ideology*, *Redistribution preferences* and *Cultural liberalism* are the only variables taken into account. In Model 2, *Europeanism* is added. In Model 3, *Immigration* is incorporated, and all variables have been entered. In Appendix C we included the same model with the different levels of *Cultural liberalism* and *Redistribution preferences*. Appendix D includes plots of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables.

Ideology

Ideological self-positioning is the variable that changes the most after unitary increases (p-value < 0.01). For each extra unit towards the right (10), the propensity to vote social democratic parties decreases 34.5%, all other terms being fixed.

Redistribution preferences

Support for redistribution supported by the government is the measure related to value preferences with more impact on the decision to vote socialist parties (p-value < 0.01). On a five-point scale, each unitary increase towards maximum support for redistribution translates into 15.7% more chances to vote socialist parties *ceteris paribus*.

Cultural liberalism

Cultural liberalism situates as the third most intense item related to the vote to socialist platforms (p-value < 0.01). Like in the previous variables, each unitary increase towards maximum support for cultural liberalism translates into 2.9% more chances to vote socialist parties *ceteris paribus*.

Europeanism

The confidence in the European Parliament situates itself as the third most important factor in the model (p-value < 0.01). For each unitary increase towards maximum confidence (10), there is an increase of 7.3% in the likelihood to vote socialist platforms, if all other variables are held fixed.

Immigration

A favorable vision of the impact of immigrants on the economy implies less propensity to vote these political platforms but being far away from the magnitude of the former variable 1.2% less by unitary increase, all other variables *ceteris paribus* (p-value < 0.01).

Table 2: Ideological model

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ideology (0-10)	−0.421*** (0.004)	−0.423*** (0.004)	−0.424*** (0.005)
Redistribution preferences	0.140*** (0.008)	0.147*** (0.008)	0.146*** (0.008)
Cultural liberalism	0.038*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)
Europeanism (0-10)		0.067*** (0.004)	0.070*** (0.004)
Immigration (0-10)			−0.012*** (0.004)
Constant	0.351*** (0.073)	0.091 (0.077)	0.118 (0.079)
Observations	106,859	98,501	96,761
Log Likelihood	−48,238.530	−44,384.020	−43,625.250
Akaike Inf. Crit.	96,525.060	88,818.030	87,302.510
Cox and Snell R Sq.	.157	.161	.161
Nagelkerke R Sq.	.220	.225	.225

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.

5.3. Socio-structural variables – Values and preferences

We summarize the results obtained in four multinomial logistic regressions to explain *Redistribution* preferences, *Cultural Liberalism*, *Europeanism* and *Immigration* preferences through social class, education and gender. Plots of predicted probabilities are offered in Appendix E.

5.3.1. Redistribution preferences

Social class

The coefficients of Skilled manual workers and Farm workers are not statistically different from zero across all response categories, which implies that their overall support to redistribution can be said to be equal to that of Semi-unskilled manual workers (reference group). Also, Higher Service workers exhibit less indifference and are less likely to support redistribution mildly (“*Agree*”) or openly (“*Strongly agree*”) at p-value < 0.01. Likewise, Lower Service workers are more prone to be moderately against it (“*Disagree*”) and also less likely to support it moderately or openly at the same confidence level

Finally, Routine/clerical sales workers are the group outside the working-class whose moderate and open support for redistribution resembles the reference group the most (p-values <0.05 and <0.01). Farmers/Farm managers are the more strongly opposed, less indifferent and least supportive group (p-value <0.01).

Education

As educational attainment goes up, support for redistribution preferences goes down. In comparison to ISCED 0-1, individuals with ISCED 2 are less likely to be indifferent (p-value < 0.1) and both moderately and openly for redistribution (p-value <0.01), respectively. The same holds true for ISCED 3, except for the non-significant category "*Neither agree nor disagree*". Furthermore, ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6 present distinctively larger negative coefficients in their moderate and open support to redistribution (p-value <0.01), respectively. The latter group is also less prone to be indifferent on the stance.

Gender

Females are more supportive than males in redistribution preferences. The former gender exhibits stronger probabilities to support it ("*Strongly Agree*" and "*Agree*") and to be indifferent/neutral on the matter ("*Neither agree nor disagree*"), while also showing higher levels of weak opposition ("*Disagree*") at p-value <0.01 .

Table 1: Value orientations and preferences - Socio-structural characteristics

	<i>Dependent variable: Redistribution preferences</i>			
	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Social class				
- Higher Service	0.040 (0.076)	-0.321*** (0.076)	-0.699*** (0.071)	-0.803*** (0.075)
- Lower Service	0.194*** (0.069)	0.019 (0.069)	-0.330*** (0.065)	-0.420*** (0.067)
- Routine clerical/sales	0.075 (0.071)	0.021 (0.070)	-0.160** (0.066)	-0.231*** (0.067)
- Skilled manual	0.121 (0.081)	0.114 (0.080)	0.046 (0.075)	-0.041 (0.077)
- Farm workers	0.054 (0.129)	0.109 (0.127)	0.049 (0.119)	-0.168 (0.121)
- Farmers/Farm managers	-1.025*** (0.234)	-1.454*** (0.247)	-1.366*** (0.189)	-1.848*** (0.202)
Education level				
- ISCED 2	-0.027 (0.092)	-0.175* (0.090)	-0.264*** (0.085)	-0.264*** (0.086)
- ISCED 3	0.029 (0.087)	-0.082 (0.085)	-0.275*** (0.080)	-0.257*** (0.082)
- ISCED 4	-0.008 (0.124)	-0.168 (0.123)	-0.481*** (0.116)	-0.401*** (0.120)
- ISCED 5-6	-0.111 (0.088)	-0.349*** (0.086)	-0.612*** (0.081)	-0.692*** (0.083)
Female	0.179*** (0.043)	0.423*** (0.043)	0.512*** (0.040)	0.512*** (0.042)
Constant	1.018*** (0.174)	0.915*** (0.172)	2.473*** (0.160)	1.812*** (0.164)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	242,329.900	242,329.900	242,329.900	242,329.900

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round and control by feelings about family income.

5.3.2. Cultural liberalism

Social class

Higher Service, Lower Service and Routine clerical/sales workers are the social groups supporting more clearly the right of gays and lesbians to live their own lives (p-value < 0.01), which is taken as a proxy for the dimension of *Cultural liberalism*. On the other hand, Skilled manual workers exhibit more probabilities to manifest weak opposition (p-value = 0.1), but are notably more likely to be indifferent and also on agreeing more with the stance (p-value < 0.01). Finally, Farm workers and Farmers/Farm managers exhibit higher levels of mild and strong rejection than the reference category of Semi-unskilled manual workers at p-value < 0.01.

Education

As the results show, education level is strongly linked with *Cultural Liberalism*. Medium and higher levels of education ranging from ISCED 3 to ISCED 5-6 are more likely to support mildly or strongly the freedom of choice of lesbians and gays at p-value lower than 0.01. However, it is also true that their neutrality or indifference also experiments an important surge with respect to the reference category at the same level of confidence. The same holds true for ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6 regarding their weak opposition to the stance (p-value < 0.05 and < 0.01, respectively).

Gender

Females are more supportive than males in matters of cultural liberalism. The former gender exhibits singularly higher probabilities to embrace libertarian vision strongly (p-value < 0.01) – up to an increase close to 81%. Afterwards, mildly support is 31.9% more likely (same p-value) and 10.4% more indifference at p-value < 0.05. No statistically differences in their weak opposition in comparison to males.

Table 2: Value orientations and preferences - Socio-structural characteristics

	<i>Dependent variable: Cultural liberalism</i>			
	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Social class				
- Higher Service	0.135 (0.086)	0.423*** (0.080)	0.499*** (0.073)	0.544*** (0.075)
- Lower Service	0.110* (0.066)	0.318*** (0.061)	0.410*** (0.056)	0.421*** (0.057)
- Routine clerical/sales	0.077 (0.060)	0.211*** (0.056)	0.365*** (0.051)	0.359*** (0.052)
- Skilled manual	0.110* (0.060)	0.222*** (0.057)	0.159*** (0.052)	0.009 (0.054)
- Farm workers	0.065 (0.072)	-0.092 (0.071)	-0.406*** (0.065)	-0.708*** (0.073)
- Farmers/Farm managers	-0.003 (0.254)	0.479** (0.215)	-0.334 (0.208)	-0.764*** (0.215)
Education level				
- ISCED 2	0.121* (0.067)	0.167*** (0.063)	0.458*** (0.057)	0.670*** (0.060)
- ISCED 3	0.115* (0.068)	0.375*** (0.063)	0.713*** (0.057)	1.128*** (0.059)
- ISCED 4	0.297** (0.125)	0.436*** (0.119)	1.027*** (0.108)	1.571*** (0.110)
- ISCED 5-6	0.243*** (0.081)	0.448*** (0.075)	0.884*** (0.069)	1.579*** (0.070)
Female	0.043 (0.041)	0.099** (0.039)	0.277*** (0.035)	0.592*** (0.036)
Constant	0.643*** (0.163)	0.765*** (0.153)	1.218*** (0.142)	0.458*** (0.144)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	228,844.300	228,844.300	228,844.300	228,844.300

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round, and controlled by feelings about family income.

5.3.3. Europeanism

Social class

Higher Service, Lower Service and Routine clerical/sales workers are the social groups trusting the European Parliament in higher numbers at $p\text{-value} < 0.01$. Conversely, Skilled manual workers are less likely to trust it. Within a scale of 0-10, predicted probabilities are lower in values 9-10 ($p\text{-value} < 0.01$), 5-6 ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$) and 3-4 ($p\text{-value} < 0.1$). Farm workers also obtain negative coefficients at 9-10 ($p\text{-value} < 0.10$).

Education

Higher educational levels are linked to higher support for *Europeanism*. In comparison to the reference category, individuals with ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6 trust the European Parliament with qualifications ranging from 7 to 8 (high) 70.4% and 102.9% more, respectively. Likewise, they are more likely to back neutral (5-6) and maximum (9-10) qualifications at $p\text{-value} < 0.01$. On the other hand, ISCED 2 concentrates around low (3-4) and medium qualifications, while ISCED 3 has a more homogenous impact on all categories ($p\text{-value} < 0.01$).

Gender

Females are more prone to support neutral (5-6), low (3-4) and high (7-8) qualifications of trust in the European Parliament in comparison to men ($p\text{-value} < 0.01$).

Table 3: Value orientations and preferences - Socio-structural characteristics

	<i>Dependent variable: Europeanism</i>			
	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10
Social class				
- Higher Service	0.163*** (0.041)	0.230*** (0.039)	0.302*** (0.048)	0.043 (0.090)
- Lower Service	0.103*** (0.033)	0.221*** (0.031)	0.329*** (0.039)	-0.046 (0.073)
- Routine clerical/sales	0.096*** (0.031)	0.161*** (0.030)	0.307*** (0.038)	-0.029 (0.070)
- Skilled manual	-0.068* (0.035)	-0.081** (0.033)	0.037 (0.042)	-0.208*** (0.076)
- Farm workers	0.043 (0.054)	0.071 (0.050)	0.100 (0.064)	-0.191* (0.113)
- Farmers/Farm managers	-0.010 (0.153)	-0.165 (0.147)	0.211 (0.173)	-5.499 (4.424)
Education level				
- ISCED 2	0.227*** (0.037)	0.231*** (0.035)	0.156*** (0.046)	-0.047 (0.085)
- ISCED 3	0.272*** (0.036)	0.307*** (0.034)	0.300*** (0.044)	-0.020 (0.081)
- ISCED 4	0.493*** (0.061)	0.410*** (0.058)	0.533*** (0.070)	0.355*** (0.125)
- ISCED 5-6	0.388*** (0.038)	0.517*** (0.036)	0.708*** (0.046)	0.236*** (0.089)
Female	0.196*** (0.022)	0.266*** (0.020)	0.179*** (0.025)	0.006 (0.048)
Constant	-0.381*** (0.079)	-0.271*** (0.077)	-1.211*** (0.099)	-2.587*** (0.229)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	238,543.400	238,543.400	238,543.400	238,543.400

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round, and controlled by feelings about family income.

5.3.4. Immigration

Social class

Higher Service and Lower Service register the highest predicted probabilities to support immigration as positive for the national economy (p-value < 0.01). Routine clerical/sales show a more moderate vision of immigration across high and maximum levels of support (p-value < 0.01), while also embracing lower levels of approval of the stance (p-value < 0.1). Finally, Skilled manual workers are less likely to rate immigration as positive for the economy at high (7-8) and maximum (9-10) qualifications (p-value < 0.1).

Education

Higher educational levels are linked to higher support for Immigration as beneficial for the national economy. Individuals with ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6 have more probabilities to defend this stance within maximum (9-10), high (7-8) and neutral (5-6) levels at p-value < 0.01, especially in the case of the latter group. On the other hand, ISCED 2 exhibits less support for these levels, while ISCED 3 has a more homogenous, yet positively progressing impact on all categories (p-value < 0.01).

Gender

Females are more likely to qualify immigration as worse for the economy than their male counterparts, since each further category of acceptance offers higher negative coefficients (p-value < 0.1 and < 0.01).

Table 4: Value orientations and preferences - Socio-structural characteristics

	<i>Dependent variable: Immigration</i>			
	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10
Social class				
- Higher Service	0.141*** (0.052)	0.421*** (0.046)	0.688*** (0.050)	0.607*** (0.071)
- Lower Service	0.180*** (0.038)	0.436*** (0.034)	0.652*** (0.038)	0.545*** (0.059)
- Routine clerical/sales	0.062* (0.033)	0.258*** (0.030)	0.300*** (0.036)	0.282*** (0.057)
- Skilled manual	0.009 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.070* (0.040)	-0.124* (0.065)
- Farm workers	-0.121** (0.054)	-0.012 (0.049)	-0.080 (0.059)	-0.004 (0.093)
- Farmers/Farm workers	0.209 (0.163)	0.128 (0.152)	0.184 (0.182)	-1.080** (0.492)
Education level				
- ISCED 2	0.018 (0.037)	0.116*** (0.034)	0.122*** (0.043)	0.254*** (0.075)
- ISCED 3	0.184*** (0.037)	0.372*** (0.034)	0.598*** (0.041)	0.566*** (0.071)
- ISCED 4	0.417*** (0.072)	0.749*** (0.065)	1.103*** (0.072)	1.077*** (0.108)
- ISCED 5-6	0.504*** (0.044)	0.980*** (0.040)	1.591*** (0.046)	1.709*** (0.074)
Female	0.042* (0.024)	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.398*** (0.025)	-0.460*** (0.037)
Constant	0.453*** (0.104)	0.904*** (0.096)	0.542*** (0.102)	-0.584*** (0.137)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	256,401.700	256,401.700	256,401.700	256,401.700

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round and controlled by feelings about family income.

6. Discussion

Once we have summarized the results, we will assess their meaning in light of reviewed literature, our research objectives and the stated hypotheses. To start, we structure three separate parts to comment on our findings and link it to the set of hypotheses – *Socio-structural and ideological model* (Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3), *Interaction social class and education level* (Hypothesis 4) and *Relationships of socio-structural characteristics with values and issue preferences* (Hypothesis 5). Afterwards, we examine the limitations of the findings and offer suggestions for further research.

Socio-structural and ideological model

First of all, we demonstrated that the ideological model explains the vote to socialist parties better than the socio-structural explanation. The value of the measure of Log. Likelihood ratio is lower in the former model in comparison with the latter: - 43,625.250 and - 49,838.260, respectively. Therefore, we can affirm that the goodness of fit is better in the ideological and value preferences setting. This finding concurs with the results of the work of Knusten (2018). Lastly, we reinforce the validation of H1 with the inclusion of Cox and Snell R^2 and Nagelkerke R^2 , which deliver a similar conclusion – .055 and .078 in front of .161 and .225³.

Regarding the first sub-hypotheses, we now proceed to comment on their validity. As literature has been consistently showing, women in post-industrial societies tend to favor the left and progressive programs in higher numbers than men (Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014; Giger, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Our findings reinforce the strength of these claims by demonstrating that females are statistically significant different than males in voting patterns to socialist parties, being more prone to cast ballots in their favor (Sub-hypothesis 1.1.). Moreover, we coincide with the results of Knusten (2018) regarding the lower predictive power of gender in comparison to other factors, such as education or class.

Furthermore, strong redistribution preferences are the most important factor driving the vote of socialist parties within values and issue preferences (Sub-hypothesis 1.2). This issue pertains to the domain of “Old Politics”, that is, the fight for income equality and justice, from which social democratic parties thrived in their early years (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). As results show, the redistribution of wealth continues to be at the forefront of the reasons why socialist voters continue choosing that ballot.

³ Calculation obtained with software *IBM SPSS Statistics*.

In connection to the dimension of “New Politics”, cultural liberalism in the form of support to multiculturalism, women and LGBT+ rights and other minorities was also devised as a potential source of support for socialist parties (Sub-hypothesis 1.3). Surprisingly, we found out that its influence ranked below that of the variable of *Europeanism*. Further, the small yet negative effect of the *Immigration* is also an unexpected result in accordance with the politics of socialist parties regarding this issue. This raises important questions regarding the salience of European integration and immigration flows as factors of vote mobilization in national elections (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al, 2008).

If we dive into the ideological model present in Appendix C, we observe how the only statistically significant levels are “*Agree*” (p-value < 0.01) and “*Strongly agree*” (p-value < 0.1). We contend that the impact of education in determining socio-cultural orientations combined with the heightened presence of less educated strata among socialist voters may be behind these results. We suggest that the lower coefficient (almost half in comparison to “*Agree*”) of the latter category has to do with the vote of part of the new middle classes with firm libertarian values to the New Left (Kriesi et al., 2008; Kriesi, 1998).

Second of all, the obtained results allow us to accept that social class accounts for the vote to socialist parties (H2). All categories are statistically different from zero, being all other social groups apart from the reference category (Semi-unskilled manual workers) less likely to vote socialist parties (Sub-hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2). In connection with this idea, Routine clerical/sales workers are the group outside of the working-class which votes social democratic parties the most (Sub-hypothesis 2.3).

This constitutes a reinforcement of the thesis arguing social democratic parties reoriented their electoral basis towards the new middle classes (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Kriesi, 1998), drawing less on the mobilization based on class mobilization and emphasizing cultural issues (Kitschelt, 1995; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). Interestingly, the difference in the odds ratio between the third and fourth categories in the Erikson-Goldthorpe scheme is the smallest among groups. Class voting is not in decay (Evans, 1999b; Knutsen, 2018), but certainly, its contours and dynamics are evolving and changing in the context of the cultural conflict of “New Politics” (Oesch, 2015).

Thirdly, the results of the first logistical binary regression also demonstrate educational attainment is linked to decreasing propensity to vote socialist parties (Hypothesis 3). All levels apart from ISCED 0-1 yield negative coefficients at p-value < 0.01 (Sub-hypothesis 3.1). Since education is a factor affected by multiple variables, especially social class and income (Marshall, 2016) its

negative relationship with the vote social democracy might be due to two causes. First and as previously commented, more vote to the New Left because of its libertarian stances. Second, more vote to conservative parties due to their emphasis on economic issues, where social class is more salient than education in conforming preferences (Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2015). In any case, our findings coincide with those of Knusten (2018).

Interaction social class and education level

Through the interaction of social class with education level, we discovered that the effect of the education variable does not strictly coincide with that of the variable of class grouping (Hypothesis 4) as the findings of authors like Jansen et al. (2013) might prompt to think. Lower levels of educational attainment (ISCED 0-1 and ISCED 2⁴) have a more positive effect across all social groups in comparison to medium and higher levels (ISCED 3 and ISCED 5-6). We link this finding to build up support for H3. Even though Higher Service and Lower Service workers register positive effects in the mentioned educational levels, we are conscious of the fact that ISCED 0-1 and ISCED 2 individuals within these groups add to less or around 15% of the total.

Except for Higher Service workers (17.59%), ISCED 3 represents in the rest of groups more than 30% of their educational composition and has their peaks at Semi-unskilled manual workers (49.31%) and Routine clerical/sales workers (45.21%). Being the most homogenous level with respect to the internal composition of social classes, the five main groups of interest in this research⁵ exhibit similar predicted probabilities to vote socialist parties (30 - 35%). We find that higher propensity to vote socialist parties among higher strata (Higher and Lower Service) is more pronounced and it follows the contrary trend among Semi-unskilled manual, Routine clerical/sales and Skilled manual workers. In other words, "*Upper-secondary education*" increases the propensity of higher strata to vote socialist parties while lowering it among the working-class and the new middle classes.

Finally, we examine the interaction of "*Tertiary education completed*" (ISCED 5-6) and Higher Service (71.06%), Lower Service (47.26%) plus Routine clerical/sales (19.63%), it can be concluded that there is a strong correlation between social class, education and vote at this level. The distance between individuals with and without this educational attainment level grows smaller as it goes from Higher Service to Routine clerical/sales. The latter group is the only one in which

⁴ The sum of both categories goes beyond 25% only in Routine clerical/sales (29.31%), Skilled manual (38.33%) and Farm workers (62.2%).

⁵ Skilled manual, Semi-unskilled manual and Routine clerical/sales workers, plus Higher and Lower Service workers.

individuals with ISCED 5-6 have higher predicted probabilities to vote socialist parties than those with other levels.

Relationships of socio-structural characteristics with value and issue preferences

The obtained results lead us to confirm the hypothesis that socio-structural values directly affect the positioning on issues and the values. Linked to this, we also demonstrated that social class is more prevalent in redistribution issues, while education is more salient in socio-cultural issues (Hypothesis 5). Furthermore, we have detected that gender plays a distinctive role in shaping the values and issue preferences alongside social class and education.

Semi-Unskilled manual, Skilled manual and Routine clerical/sales workers favor redistribution actions the most (Sub-hypothesis 5.1). Taking a look at the education patterns reveals that most educated people do not favor redistribution, but less educated strata do. In this case, social class pulls education. Conversely, in the case of cultural liberalism the contrary holds. Lower Service, Higher Service and Routine clerical/sales workers, that is the most educated social groups, favor cultural liberalism the most (Sub-hypothesis 5.2). Both findings contribute to literature signaling the importance of education and class as factors conforming and influencing values and preferences (Inglehart, 2018; Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2015; Kitschelt, 1995; Knutsen, 2018).

On the other hand, the inclusion of *Europeanism* and *Immigration* exposes combine elements of both economic and cultural nature. Thus, they can be understood to be part of another dimension of conflict (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al, 2008), since they introduce changes in both economic competition and group identity. We suggest that preferences at these levels have to do with education and social class at the same time. This might provide a satisfactory answer to the fact that Higher Service and Lower service, the most educated segment of workers, have the highest trust in the European Parliament and the strongest belief that immigrants contribute positively to the national economy (Sub-hypothesis 5.3 and 5.4).

Last but not least, gender emerges as a third key dimension to support the formation of preferences and values. According to the results, women support redistribution and cultural liberalism at higher levels than men (Sub-hypothesis 5.5). Nonetheless, they are more opposed than their male counterparts regarding the impact of immigration on national wealth and trust in the European Parliament. Without a doubt, these findings reveal that gender has consolidated as a distinguishable factor in post-industrial societies.

Limitations

This research paper acknowledges several limitations regarding design, results and scope. First of all, we have opted for the construction of a dichotomous dependent variable to try to explain the factors influencing the vote to socialist parties. In this regard, Knutsen (2018) points out that the treatment of the variable itself is an important component which has noticeable effects on the measurement of the impact of socio-structural variables in voting choice.

In addition to this point, time period constraints and the number and variety of included countries is another set of limitations. The availability of data files for several countries is irregular at best and non-existent for long spans of time in other cases. Due to this reason, we have had to exclude countries such as Italy, Greece or the Czech Republic.

Moreover, changes in the measurement of variables have also affected the extension in time and the design of models. On the one hand, the variable of social class was switched to a similar measure, yet one that was not convertible under the EGP scheme in the same way. Its usage has limitations in the sense that it lacks details about the basic routine in the job and its environment (Coffé, 2015). On the other hand, income was another variable of interest which could not be included because of new criterion in their construction and interpretation across deciles in later rounds of the ESS. Last but not least, some interesting variables explicitly asking for European integration or the welfare state were constrained to a few ESS rounds.

Future research

Future research should further explore the persistence of social class and other socio-structural elements in determining party choice in the context of coexistence between “Old Politics” and “New Politics”. Also, it would be interesting to pay attention at the increasing salience of issues related to a third pole of conflict or *transnational/globalization cleavage* (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al, 2008), and how do they affect the vote to traditional families such as socialists, liberals and conservatives.

Furthermore, the role of education and its interaction with other elements shaping values and preferences should also be examined. Particularly, we would look forward to unraveling the interplay between education, gender and class and their combined predicted probabilities to party choice. This way, new information about the complex mechanisms of voting in post-industrial, highly educated and internationalized societies would be obtained.

Conclusions

This research paper aimed to estimate the explanatory power of both socio-structural characteristics and value and issue preferences, as well as their interaction, in the vote to European socialist parties in the first decade of the 21st century. Based on the longitudinal study of five rounds of the *European Social Survey* (ESS) across seventeen countries, it can be concluded that values and issue preferences better account for voting social democratic platforms. Moreover, renewed insights about the role of social class, education and gender as socio-structural variables in shaping values and issue preferences of both “Old Politics” and “New Politics” issues are offered alongside findings regarding distinctive education effects in specific levels.

Our starting point was to examine the current state of affairs in political competition for social democratic parties. We explored the theoretical paradigms and conceptual frameworks connected to both traditional and “New Politics” in conjunction with a review of the electoral strategies of socialist parties to build a set of hypotheses with derived assumptions. The methodological tools selected were logistical binary and multinomial regressions to obtain information about the factors affecting the outcomes as well as their intensity and direction.

The main contributions of this research are threefold. First, we reinforced the vision that the voting gap between the working class and the new middle classes is diminishing as outlined in Knutsen (2018) and Gingrich and Häusermann (2015). Second, “Old politics” issues such as *Redistribution preferences* still surpass “New Politics” issues as *Cultural liberalism*. The salience of trust in the European Parliament and the impact of immigration on the national economy further complicate the rationale of the vote to socialist parties. Third, our results also agree with literature stressing in the role of education and social class in influencing values and preferences of “Old Politics” and “New Politics”, respectively (Inglehart, 2018; Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2015; Kitschelt, 1995; Knutsen, 2018).

Further, we showed that gender also has a specific and particular effect in orientating values and preferences usually favoring the stances of socialist parties and the Left (Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014; Giger, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Apart from that, we illustrated how individuals with “*Upper secondary education completed*” (ISCED 3) within higher social strata (Lower and Higher Service) had more propension to vote for socialist parties. Conversely, the new middle classes (Routine clerical/sales workers) vote socialist parties at higher rates in “*Tertiary education completed*” (ISCED 5-6). In light of these finding, more inputs about the

relationship between education and class would be beneficial to understand contemporary class voting. We strongly emphasize the importance of this discovery given the soaring role of education and class in determining political behavior in a political context dominated by socio-cultural issues (Oesch, 2015).

Several limitations regarding design, results and scope are recognized. The mode of construction of the dependent variable and its effects to account for the impact of socio-structural variables in voting choice, the measure selected to account for social class, time period constraints and unavailability of data files, and the lack of continuity of variables due to their replacement by others (social class) or their change in interpretation (income) have been the main hurdles encountered.

Finally, we consider further research is needed to determine more precisely the importance of socio-structural factors in explaining party choice in the post-economic crisis context and within the framework of globalization. The impact of the financial crisis, European integration or the refugee crisis configures a totally different landscape in which social democratic parties are being challenged by competitors specialized in those issues (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Connected to this, the interplay of education, gender and social class should also be explored in more depth to dilucidated the evolution of their salience in shaping values and issue preferences in time, particularly in the case of the first two variables.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Predicted probabilities in the Socio-structural model

Figure 1A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Social class*






Figure 2A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Education*




Numerical values correspond to the following levels, from 1 to 5: ISCED 0-1, ISCED 2, ISCED 3, ISCED 4 and ISCED 5-6.

Figure 3A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Gender*



Value 1 corresponds to Male, value 2 to Female.

Figure 4A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Membership in a trade union*



Value 1 correspond to current members, value 2 to former ones and value 3 to the rest of individuals.

Figure 5A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by Religious degree





Figure 6A. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Feelings about family income*



Value 1 corresponds to “Living comfortably on present income”, value 2 to “Coping on present income”, value 3 to “Difficult with present income” and value 4 to “Very difficult on present income”.

Appendix B – Interaction models Education – Class (Dummies ISCED)

Table 1B. Interaction class and ISCED 0-1

Table 1: Education - Class interaction			
	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social class			
- Higher Service	-0.329*** (0.029)	-0.327*** (0.029)	-0.327*** (0.029)
- Lower Service	-0.228*** (0.024)	-0.226*** (0.024)	-0.241*** (0.024)
- Routine clerical/sales	-0.185*** (0.024)	-0.183*** (0.024)	-0.175*** (0.024)
- Skilled manual	-0.150*** (0.028)	-0.148*** (0.028)	-0.165*** (0.029)
- Farm workers	-0.820*** (0.053)	-0.816*** (0.054)	-0.706*** (0.054)
- Farmers/Farm Managers	-0.786*** (0.184)	-0.783*** (0.184)	-0.770*** (0.185)
ISCED 1	0.233*** (0.033)	0.238*** (0.034)	0.316*** (0.034)
Higher Service:ISCED 1	-0.119 (0.124)	-0.121 (0.124)	-0.108 (0.125)
Lower Service:ISCED 1	-0.318*** (0.074)	-0.320*** (0.074)	-0.297*** (0.075)
Routine clerical/sales:ISCED 1	-0.132** (0.056)	-0.136** (0.056)	-0.142** (0.057)
Skilled manual:ISCED 1	0.095 (0.058)	0.099* (0.058)	0.105* (0.059)
Farm workers:ISCED 1	0.155* (0.085)	0.144* (0.085)	0.122 (0.086)
Farmers/Farm managers:ISCED 1	-0.249 (0.290)	-0.252 (0.290)	-0.283 (0.292)
Female		0.007 (0.015)	0.095*** (0.016)
Age		-0.0002 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.001)
Membership in a trade union			
- Former member of a trade union			-0.202*** (0.023)
- Never a trade unionist			-0.504*** (0.020)
Religious degree			-0.065*** (0.003)

Feeling about family income

- Coping on present income	0.095*** (0.017)	0.097*** (0.017)	0.091*** (0.017)
- Difficult on present income	0.166*** (0.025)	0.165*** (0.025)	0.168*** (0.025)
- Very difficult on present income	0.203*** (0.044)	0.205*** (0.044)	0.199*** (0.044)
Constant	-0.868*** (0.060)	-0.867*** (0.064)	-0.301*** (0.067)
Observations	106,633	106,304	105,327
Log Likelihood	-50,862.510	-50,726.910	-49,823.570
Akaike Inf. Crit.	101,799.000	101,531.800	99,731.130

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.

Table 2B. Interaction class and ISCED 2

Table 2: Education - Class interaction

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social class			
- Higher Service	-0.367*** (0.029)	-0.360*** (0.029)	-0.379*** (0.029)
- Lower Service	-0.257*** (0.024)	-0.251*** (0.024)	-0.284*** (0.024)
- Routine clerical/sales	-0.206*** (0.024)	-0.200*** (0.024)	-0.212*** (0.025)
- Skilled manual	-0.113*** (0.028)	-0.107*** (0.028)	-0.133*** (0.028)
- Farm workers	-0.744*** (0.049)	-0.755*** (0.049)	-0.660*** (0.049)
- Farmers/Farm Managers	-1.006*** (0.158)	-1.009*** (0.158)	-0.991*** (0.159)
ISCED 2	0.077** (0.033)	0.077** (0.033)	0.071** (0.033)
Higher Service:ISCED 2	-0.096 (0.096)	-0.103 (0.096)	-0.068 (0.096)
Lower Service:ISCED 2	-0.260*** (0.061)	-0.266*** (0.061)	-0.224*** (0.062)
Routine clerical/sales:ISCED 2	-0.135*** (0.049)	-0.144*** (0.049)	-0.109** (0.050)
Skilled manual:ISCED 2	-0.155*** (0.060)	-0.156*** (0.060)	-0.135** (0.061)
Farm workers:ISCED 2	0.018 (0.091)	0.022 (0.091)	0.045 (0.092)
Farmers/Farm managers:ISCED 2	1.183*** (0.403)	1.170*** (0.403)	1.048** (0.412)
Female		0.012 (0.015)	0.099*** (0.016)
Age		0.001*** (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0005)
Membership in a trade union			
- Former member of a trade union			-0.194*** (0.023)
- Never a trade unionist			-0.484*** (0.020)
Religious degree			-0.063*** (0.003)

Feeling about family income

- Coping on present income	0.104*** (0.017)	0.106*** (0.017)	0.102*** (0.017)
- Difficult on present income	0.180*** (0.024)	0.180*** (0.025)	0.187*** (0.025)
- Very difficult on present income	0.226*** (0.044)	0.229*** (0.044)	0.230*** (0.044)
Constant	-0.860*** (0.060)	-0.931*** (0.064)	-0.395*** (0.067)
Observations	106,633	106,304	105,327
Log Likelihood	-50,884.680	-50,752.550	-49,877.900
Akaike Inf. Crit.	101,843.400	101,583.100	99,839.790

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.

Table 3B. Interaction class and ISCED 3

Table 3: Education - Class interaction

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social class			
- Higher Service	-0.521*** (0.030)	-0.518*** (0.031)	-0.551*** (0.031)
- Lower Service	-0.430*** (0.026)	-0.426*** (0.026)	-0.474*** (0.027)
- Routine clerical/sales	-0.314*** (0.026)	-0.313*** (0.027)	-0.324*** (0.027)
- Skilled manual	-0.241*** (0.032)	-0.235*** (0.033)	-0.251*** (0.033)
- Farm workers	-0.727*** (0.048)	-0.733*** (0.048)	-0.630*** (0.048)
- Farmers/Farm Managers	-0.800*** (0.170)	-0.800*** (0.170)	-0.816*** (0.172)
ISCED 3	-0.282*** (0.032)	-0.278*** (0.033)	-0.328*** (0.033)
Higher Service:ISCED 3	0.492*** (0.064)	0.489*** (0.065)	0.535*** (0.065)
Lower Service:ISCED 3	0.403*** (0.045)	0.397*** (0.046)	0.453*** (0.046)
Routine clerical/sales:ISCED 3	0.236*** (0.043)	0.239*** (0.043)	0.264*** (0.044)
Skilled manual:ISCED 3	0.273*** (0.050)	0.268*** (0.050)	0.271*** (0.051)
Farm workers:ISCED 3	-0.116 (0.096)	-0.109 (0.096)	-0.113 (0.097)
Farmers/Farm managers:ISCED 3	-0.211 (0.315)	-0.209 (0.315)	-0.150 (0.316)
Female		0.007 (0.015)	0.095*** (0.016)
Age		0.0004 (0.0004)	0.001*** (0.0005)
Membership in a trade union			
- Former member of a trade union			-0.201*** (0.023)
- Never a trade unionist			-0.498*** (0.020)
Religious degree			-0.064*** (0.003)

Feeling about family income

- Coping on present income	0.095*** (0.017)	0.096*** (0.017)	0.093*** (0.017)
- Difficult on present income	0.167*** (0.024)	0.166*** (0.025)	0.174*** (0.025)
- Very difficult on present income	0.204*** (0.044)	0.207*** (0.044)	0.206*** (0.044)
Constant	-0.733*** (0.060)	-0.760*** (0.066)	-0.185*** (0.068)
Observations	106,633	106,304	105,327
Log Likelihood	-50,848.690	-50,716.710	-49,822.540
Akaike Inf. Crit.	101,771.400	101,511.400	99,729.080

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.

Table 4B. Interaction class and ISCED 5-6

Table 4: Education - Class interaction			
	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social class			
- Lower Service	-0.019 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.017 (0.045)
- Routine clerical/sales	0.020 (0.043)	0.021 (0.043)	0.029 (0.044)
- Skilled manual	0.157*** (0.044)	0.160*** (0.045)	0.147*** (0.045)
- Semi-Unskilled manual	0.272*** (0.042)	0.270*** (0.043)	0.278*** (0.043)
- Farm workers	-0.426*** (0.056)	-0.437*** (0.056)	-0.328*** (0.057)
- Farmers/Farm Managers	-0.593*** (0.157)	-0.598*** (0.157)	-0.588*** (0.158)
ISCED 5-6	-0.168*** (0.047)	-0.163*** (0.047)	-0.179*** (0.047)
Lower Service:ISCED 5-6	0.153*** (0.055)	0.151*** (0.055)	0.119** (0.056)
Routine clerical/sales:ISCED 5-6	0.226*** (0.059)	0.224*** (0.059)	0.201*** (0.059)
Skilled manual:ISCED 5-6	-0.214** (0.084)	-0.212** (0.084)	-0.213** (0.085)
Semi-Unskilled manual:ISCED 5-6	0.193** (0.077)	0.189** (0.078)	0.181** (0.078)
Farm workers:ISCED 5-6	-0.604*** (0.205)	-0.591*** (0.205)	-0.586*** (0.206)
Farmers/Farm managers:ISCED 5-6	0.155 (0.434)	0.158 (0.434)	0.178 (0.435)
Female		0.013 (0.015)	0.101*** (0.016)
Age		0.001** (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0005)
Membership in a trade union			
- Former member of a trade union			-0.198*** (0.023)
- Never a trade unionist			-0.490*** (0.020)
Religious degree			-0.064*** (0.003)

Feeling about family income

- Coping on present income	0.097*** (0.017)	0.099*** (0.017)	0.093*** (0.017)
- Difficult on present income	0.170*** (0.025)	0.170*** (0.025)	0.175*** (0.025)
- Very difficult on present income	0.217*** (0.044)	0.220*** (0.044)	0.218*** (0.044)
Constant	-1.106*** (0.069)	-1.161*** (0.073)	-0.628*** (0.075)
Observations	106,633	106,304	105,327
Log Likelihood	-50,874.000	-50,742.570	-49,861.320
Akaike Inf. Crit.	101,822.000	101,563.100	99,806.640

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note 1: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.

Note 2: Higher Service selected as reference category.

Appendix C – Ideological model with sublevels in *Redistribution* and *Cultural liberalism*

Table 1C. Ideological model with variables *Redistribution preferences* and *Cultural liberalism* treated as categorical

Table 5: Ideological model


	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Vote to socialist parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ideology (0-10)	−0.424*** (0.004)	−0.426*** (0.004)	−0.427*** (0.005)
Redistribution preferences			
- Disagree	0.171*** (0.056)	0.136** (0.058)	0.149** (0.059)
- Neither agree nor disagree	0.351*** (0.055)	0.321*** (0.057)	0.330*** (0.058)
- Agree	0.600*** (0.053)	0.572*** (0.055)	0.579*** (0.055)
- Strongly agree	0.555*** (0.054)	0.550*** (0.056)	0.558*** (0.057)
Cultural liberalism			
- Disagree	0.035 (0.049)	−0.023 (0.052)	−0.015 (0.052)
- Neither agree nor disagree	−0.010 (0.045)	−0.066 (0.047)	−0.051 (0.048)
- Agree	0.177*** (0.041)	0.113*** (0.043)	0.131*** (0.044)
- Strongly agree	0.136*** (0.041)	0.054 (0.044)	0.079* (0.044)
Europeanism (0-10)		0.065*** (0.004)	0.068*** (0.004)
Immigration (0-10)			−0.011*** (0.004)
Constant	0.450*** (0.086)	0.255*** (0.089)	0.273*** (0.092)
Observations	106,859	98,501	96,761
Log Likelihood	−48,160.100	−44,315.440	−43,560.280
Akaike Inf. Crit.	96,380.190	88,692.880	87,184.560
Cox and Snell R Sq.	.159	.162	.162
Nagelkerke R Sq.	.222	.227	.227

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note: Fixed effects by country and ESS round.


Appendix D – Predicted probabilities in the Ideological model

Figure 1D. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Ideological self-positioning*




Value 0 corresponds to "Left" and value 10 to "Right".

Figure 2D. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Redistribution preferences*




Value 1 corresponds to "Strongly disagree", value 2 to "Disagree", value 3 to "Neither agree nor disagree", value 4 to "Agree", and value 5 to "Strongly Agree".

Figure 3D. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by Cultural liberalism




Value 1 corresponds to "*Strongly disagree*", value 2 to "*Disagree*", value 3 to "*Neither agree nor disagree*", value 4 to "*Agree*", and value 5 to "*Strongly Agree*".

Figure 4D. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Europeanism*



Value 0 corresponds to "*No confidence at all*" and value 10 to "*Total confidence*".

Figure 5D. Predicted probabilities of socialist vote by *Immigration*



Value 0 corresponds to "*Bad for the economy*" and value 10 to "*Good for the economy*".

Appendix E – Predicted probabilities in the Interaction model between issue preferences and socio-structural factors

In order to interpret the figures below, it is necessary to take into account that in *Redistribution*, category 1 corresponds to “Strongly disagree”, category 2 to “Disagree”, category 3 to “Neither agree nor disagree”, category 4 to “Agree”, and category 5 to “Strongly Agree”. The same instructions apply to *Cultural liberalism*.

Likewise, graphs examining the dimensions of *Europeanism* and *Immigration* must be interpreted bearing in mind that category 1 corresponds to values 0-2 category 2 to 3-4, category 3 to 5-6, category 4 to 7-8 and category 9-10, where 0 is “No confidence at all/Worse for the economy” and 10 maximum confidence/”Better for the economy”, respectively.

Figure 1E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Redistribution* by Social class




Figure 2E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Redistribution* by *Education*




Figure 3E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Redistribution* by *Gender*




Figure 4E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Cultural liberalism* by *Social class*




Figure 5E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Cultural liberalism* by *Education*




Figure 6E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Cultural liberalism* by Gender




Figure 7E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Europeanism* by Social class




Figure 8E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Europeanism* by *Education*




Figure 9E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Europeanism* by *Gender*




Figure 10E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Immigration* by *Social class*




Figure 11E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Immigration* by *Education*




Figure 12E. Predicted probabilities of supporting *Immigration* by Gender

